
EU ENLARGEMENT EASTWARDS: A THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY?

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'if all borders in Europe become obsolete one day, some borders might become obsolete much more slowly than others.'

S. A. Andreev (2003:8)

INTRODUCTION

On May 16 2006, the EU once again postponed setting the final date for Romania's and Bulgaria's accession to the Union. Probably for the first time in EU-history the entry of candidate states remained uncertain until about three months before the date originally set. As a Christian Democratic Member of European Parliament put it, the EU will need to 'put on the brakes' in its enlargement project.¹ In the case of the above two countries EU officials referred to their failure in speeding up reforms and fighting crime and corruption.² However, the irony is that by postponing the enlargement the EU might actually make these tasks even more difficult to achieve, while the future of European security depends to a large extent on the successful integration of Eastern Europe into the Union.

The main goal of this paper is to extend the line of thought presented in my summary of Heather Grabbe's article 'The sharp edges of Europe: Security implications of extending EU border policies eastwards' (2000). More specifically, it is an attempt to investigate why the European Union's external security policies clash with the internal ones to a significant extent and consequently undermine them to some degree.

SECURITY

During the Cold War period, security was generally understood in military terms. The term was largely equal to the survival and security of states and the use of force. This approach was, on the one hand, the result of the strongly bi-polarised nature of

¹ http://www.diepresse.at/textversion_article.aspx?id=545650, visited 2006-03-18.

² <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15780>, visited 2006-05-13.

the international arena, in which most of the world's states were siding or more or less forced to side with one of the two superpowers, either the USA or the USSR. On the other hand, the focus on state-centrism was also related to the fact that during this period states were the primary and in many cases the exclusive securitising actors as well as referent objects in the field of international security. In addition, the vast majority of international disputes took the form of inter-state conflicts. Under these conditions, it was less surprising that securing the survival and maintenance of the state was the primary objective of decision-makers prioritised over everything else.

The post-Cold War period was the time for transition from a bi-polarised international arena towards a multi-polarised or uni-polarised one (depending on whose standpoint one is taking), as well as a stark decline of traditional inter-state conflicts. This did not mean that the world had become a safer place as some scholars, mainly Liberalists in IR-theory, believed (e.g. Fukuyama: 1993). Instead, the number of intra-state conflicts and even civil wars rose dramatically. At the same time, the globalisation of the world-economy brought new opportunities not only for legal businesses but also for the black economy; focus in the field of security shifted, *inter alia*, towards illegal migration and organised crime.

Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the debate became increasingly pronounced between those who argued for a widened view of security and those who maintained that a broader interpretation of the term could undermine its essential meaning and should, therefore, be reserved for military or external political issues. This debate about the 'wide' versus 'narrow' interpretation of security has its origins in the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later in the rise of concerns with identity issues and trans-national crime during the 1990s.³

The 'wide' approach' has also been associated with the constructivist approach in social sciences. In simplistic terms, this perspective holds that security is what actors make of it. This implies that since it is a social construction, its meaning may evolve over time and its content is subject to change. This explains to some extent why the term can become more or less inclusive, depending on whether its content widened or narrowed.

³ Buzan, Waever & de Wilde (1998) p. 2.

In their book *Security: A new framework for analysis* the authors set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies.⁴ Taking on the constructivist approach, they suggest a new, sectoral approach to the analysis of security.

Five sectors are distinguished. The military sector is about the relationships of coercion and the political one is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition. The economic sector is concerned with relationships of trade, production, and finance, while the societal one with relationships of collective identity. Finally, the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.

These categories, of course, rarely exist independently. They are distinguished in order to make the identification of specific types of interaction easier, but they certainly remain inseparable entities of complex wholes. The main advantage of these sectors is that they allow the authors to confine the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions because the number of variables in play is reduced in this way.⁵

Moving on to the levels of analysis, Buzan, Waeber, and de Bilde identify the five most frequently used levels known from IR-theory. They consider levels as objects for analysis that are defined by spatial scales ranging from small to large; they are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located. It is important to note that nothing is intrinsic to the levels themselves that suggests any particular pattern or priority of relations among them.

Today the international system is equivalent to the global level, while international subsystems are groups of units within the former that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other (e.g. the EU). Units in turn are made up of actors composed of various subgroups, organisations, communities, or other entities that are sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, nations). Subunits can be organised groups of individuals within units that (try to) affect the unit's behaviour (e.g. bureaucracies, lobbies), while the bottom line of analysis is the individual.⁶

⁴ *ibid*, p. 1.

⁵ *ibid*, pp 7-8.

⁶ *ibid*, pp 5-6.

Finally, it is important to mention in this context how the same authors think about the regional dimension of security. In their view, international relations will take a more regionalised character in the post-Cold War world, because the collapse of bipolarity has removed the principal organising force at the global level.⁷

BORDERS AND PERIPHERIES

The boundary is one of the main pillars of the state, since the state has exclusive right to define judicial relations on its territory surrounded by borders.⁸ The dualistic nature of the boundary means that it divides political institutions while it can connect various societies and communities. Thereby it can function both as a barrier and a bridge depending on which of the above mentioned functions is pronounced.

In this perspective one can talk of (a) dividing, (b) filtering and (c) open boundaries.⁹

A dividing or 'closed' boundary is known for reinforcing the peripheral processes in the region at stake, such as emigration and the decay of labour market, which, in turn, provoke the decline of the economy and the emigration of the population to regions where higher living standards prevail, quite often to the centre.

The establishment of a filtering boundary is often a defensive reflex. It is usually in the defensive state's interests to take action against immigration caused by the different pricing systems, tax rules and living standards, in other words economic differences between the two sides of the borderline. One example could be the EU's Schengen Agreement. However, it is usually the activities flourishing on the other side of the boundary that the defensive state tries to filter: the black economy emerges and the smuggling of various products or persons may take off, for example. The political map has—in many cases—provided opportunities not only for entrepreneurs but also for smugglers in search of profits.¹⁰

The main feature of an open boundary is that capital, labour, economic goods and even the population can cross it freely. Therefore, the previously restricted economic field can expand. According to Lundén, an open boundary usually implies that the number of crossing points is large, and its permeability is high.¹¹

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸ Lundén (2002) p. 17.

⁹ Hardi (2000) pp 598-601.

¹⁰ Taylor & Flint (2000) p. 161.

¹¹ Lundén (1973) p. 193.

Naturally, the above described categories only exist in a theoretical construction. In reality, these qualities exist in a rather mixed manner. Each borderline has its own unique history and characteristics. Still, the categories constitute a relevant reference point for the investigation of boundaries.

The word periphery has a geographical connotation but it can also be related to the economy, for instance. In most cases, periphery refers to a region that is lagging behind the other areas in one way or another.¹² The problem is that border regions, already peripheral geographically within the states, are often peripheries from an economic viewpoint as well. This is especially true when they are located near closed or filtering boundaries.

EUROPEAN SECURITY THREATS

Traditionally, the EU has been a 'civilian power' concerned with welfare generation and economic regulation. However, as an international actor, the EU is ambiguous. The EU has always, and inescapably, been a foreign policy project,¹³ and as such, it has realised over the decades the need to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

According to Winn, EU enlargements will, more than any other event, have the greatest long-term impact on European foreign policy and the European security order more generally.¹⁴

As it has been noted earlier, interpretations of the term have undergone a great transformation in the past decades; and the widening of the concept has been crucial. As Grabbe observes, the fear of tanks and missiles arriving from behind the Iron Curtain has been supplanted by a fear of uncontrolled immigration and cross-border crime.¹⁵

Indeed, once focused on traditional war-related issues and regional instability, security priorities have recently shifted to include increased attention to terrorism and organised crime, both of which have become politically linked with immigration. In Europe, these issues are now especially controversial within the framework of the European Union's enlargement process, which itself has heightened sensitivity to security concerns. In fact, some of the central issues in enlargement debates

¹² Éger (1997) p. 237.

¹³ Winn (2003) p. 149.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁵ Grabbe (2000) p. 2.

have been illegal migration, the smuggling of humans and human trafficking. To some extent, immigration in general has been framed as a security problem due to domestic political pressures, such as increased media attention to sensationalised tragedies related to illegal migration, and also due to the rise of the radical right, which has forced parties of both the centre-right and centre-left to take more nationalist stances on the immigration issue. Moreover, fears about insecurity are natural when states cede sovereignty to supranational organisations such as the EU, especially when they feel that other Member States will contribute to insecurity with their important economic inequalities and structural inadequacies.¹⁶

International migration has become one of the newly identified non-traditional security threats since the traditional military thinking about international security issues has increasingly been abandoned. This trend is certainly related to the unprecedented scale of the phenomenon.

The statistical-methodological difficulties of measuring the scale of migration that is taking place look quite small compared to the difficulties of even estimating the dimensions of illegal migration coming from its clandestine nature. To get an idea of how little is known for sure about the extent of this phenomenon, let us compare the following figures. In a report issued in 2003 by the International Organization for Migration, the scale of illegal migration in the old EU 15 is estimated to exceed three million people.¹⁷ At the same time, in Jonas Widgren's study from 1994, the accepted estimates of the number of clandestine migrants in the EU range from 300,000 to 700,000. According to Koff, this is considered the most accurate data available today by migration experts and monitoring groups such as the IOM, even though it was collected ten years ago.¹⁸ What the various studies share is the observation that human trafficking and human smuggling have significantly increased in recent years.

Independently from the exact number that is at stake, the scale of clandestine migration flows is considered important and the European Commission has declared that 'the reduction of illegal migration flows is a political priority at both national and EU level'.

¹⁶ Koff (2005) p. 398.

¹⁷ Kicinger (2004) p. 4.

¹⁸ Koff (2005) p. 405.

EU RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

As Kicinger put it, having recognised clandestine migration as a serious security threat, the Union has taken a comprehensive, multi-level approach to the phenomenon. In her working paper *International migration as a non-traditional security threat and the EU responses to this phenomenon*, Kicinger outlines the main tools the organisation has chosen to fight it.

The list begins with preventive measures. One way of fighting the causes of clandestine migration is to establish co-operation with countries that are potential sources of illegal immigrants. This includes agreements combining migration policy with trade and development programmes; a co-operation programme that provides financial and technical assistance to such countries; and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks related to irregular migration in these countries.¹⁹

In fighting clandestine migration proper gathering and exchange of information is crucial for the success of these projects. The EU has also emphasised this from the beginning of its engagement in the issue. A more recent measure it has taken in this context was to establish the immigration liaison officers' network, the main task of which is to collect the necessary data in non-EU countries and to improve the exchange of this information among Member States.

The Union takes increased efforts to restrict the admission of clandestine migrants onto its territory. Its main tool for doing so is to impose visa requirements on all nationals arriving from states representing a high risk of irregular migration. The EU has 'a black list' of countries, the citizens of which will be asked to show up valid documents; and this list is occasionally updated. When it comes to travel documents it should also be mentioned that their security standards are constantly raised. One example here is the Schengen visa sticker, regarded as a successful co-operation in this field. More recently, a Visa Information System was planned with a view of enabling national authorities to enter and update visa data as well as to consult them electronically.²⁰

Member States also closely co-operate in external border management. This area is sometimes referred to as 'the European Union's first line of defence' and enjoys high priority when it comes to combating illegal migration. Last year, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation was established²¹ in

¹⁹ Kicinger (2004) pp 4-5.

²⁰ *ibid.*, pp 5-6.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 6.

Warsaw. In addition, a common body of European border guards was also proposed. Even though it did not receive enough political support from several Member States, the suggestion is a good example for the EU's intention to strengthen its external boundary, and discuss the workload-sharing mechanisms with the Member States.

Another measure for combating clandestine migration is the fight against black labour, in various ways because it is assumed that working opportunities represent an important motivating factor underlying illegal migration. In this respect, however, the EU's competence is rather limited since the Member States bear sole responsibility for enforcing the guidelines set up by the Union. The final, and perhaps most controversial measure introduced in 2002 is the transportation of illegal migrants back to their countries of departure.²²

EU RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN SMUGGLING

Human smuggling and human trafficking are related but separate phenomena. Human smuggling involves assisting irregular migrants without valid visas or entry papers to enter a national territory clandestinely. Many claim that it is a 'victimless crime' because smugglers merely provide a service to would-be migrants and their would-be native employers waiting to exploit cheap labour. Human trafficking, however, describes entry assistance provided to illegal migrants for the purpose of gaining economic profit from illicit activities, such as forced prostitution, forced labour, or participation in illegal markets for human organs. This distinction is important because trafficking is profitable beyond the act of smuggling.²³ However, the Council applies a similar level of punishment for both crimes, namely eight years of imprisonment.

PROBLEMS WITH EU RESPONSES

According to Kicinger, if the Union had an ambition to develop and implement migration policy at the Community level, it would have to take into account the multidimensional character of this phenomenon, including its security aspect, and respond to it. In fact the process of creating a common European migration policy is still going on. Whereas some areas have already been covered by Community legislation (visa policy, external border control, and—to a considerable extent—the asylum system), others like labour immigration or integration policy are still referred to the competence of the individual states.²⁴

²² *ibid.*, p. 6-7.

²³ Koff (2005) p. 406.

²⁴ Kicinger (2004) p. 3.

EU immigration policies have traditionally emphasised issues related to border control and illegal migration.²⁵ Government responses to immigration into the EU have narrowly focussed on security questions and border controls.²⁶ The problem with this system is that migration flows have not stopped despite technological advancements in border control (such as the use of infrared glasses for 'night vision', or improved coast guard vessels). Since the end of the Cold War, migration has been forced underground and this has led to the expansion of human trafficking and human smuggling. The paradox which needs to be recognised in the advanced industrial world is that the more migration agendas focus solely on security issues, the more the phenomenon becomes uncontrolled, insecure and unregulated.²⁷

Even though the European Parliament has attempted to pay increased attention to anti-discrimination and human rights agendas, the imbalanced distribution of power within the EU's decision-making structure has permitted the Council to firmly establish immigration as a security concern.²⁸ There is still no comprehensive recognition that human rights should be considered as being of major importance in the CFSP. According to some scholars like Winn, human rights and democracy clauses should be included in all agreements with third countries so as to contribute to the defence of democracy and basic freedoms throughout the world.²⁹

EU Member States have increasingly closed their borders to labour migration since 1994, creating a sort of 'Fortress Europe'. Despite these measures, non-European Union immigrants have continued to enter the EU. Studies have shown that human trafficking and human smuggling have increased significantly in recent years, and illegal migrants are estimated to represent one third of the foreign-born population that permanently resides on the continent. Moreover, organised criminal cartels have combined these practices with the smuggling of arms, drugs, stolen automobiles and illegal cigarettes. Within this context, the complex challenge of enlargement has contributed to an increase in uncertainty, given the difficulties that the old EU15 encountered in implementing effective border controls.³⁰

The ways in which the EU and its Member States responded to perceptions of different threats were inconsistent in the 1990s. This is partly because EU border

²⁵ Koff (2005) p. 398.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 402.

²⁷ Koff (2004) p. 409.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 398.

²⁹ Winn (2003) p. 152.

³⁰ Koff (2005) p. 398.

policies are themselves fragmented and patchily developed, following a chequered history of European integration in justice and home affairs. EU accession conditions contain a large number of security-related tasks for the eastern applicants, but these are dispersed in a range of documents and agencies. Inconsistencies between the different tasks are emerging, but are little debated in the EU owing to the technocratic nature of EU accession policy-making. Since the early 1990s, concerns to stabilise CEE have led the EU to stress peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes, fostering regional economic integration and sub-regional co-operation initiatives, as well as the integration of ethnic minority groups. However, EU policies for dealing with external borders have restrictive effects on the movement of both goods and people that are at odds with this emphasis on regional integration as a means of ensuring long-term stability and security.³¹

Migration cannot be stopped simply at the border because organised crime has developed technological and organisational solutions to bypass state controls.³² Historically, migrants have been known for their flexibility, as they move in and out of economic sectors when opportunities appear. Because migration flows must circumvent the obstacles which the EU has placed before them, migrants often turn to criminal associations that guarantee passage into the Union. Once competitors, these groups have begun to collaborate, forming multinational smuggling corporations. Thus, by focusing migration policies on security issues and border controls, receiving states that are relatively ineffective in restricting migration have driven the phenomenon underground. In doing so, they have made immigration a greater threat to both public and human security.³³

In addition, the EU's focus on migration controls has isolated regional and local officials who have not received support for integration strategies. In Koff's view, the EU has to date failed to adequately address this issue in the area of border regions³⁴, for example.

Worst of all, Kicinger sees no signs of the Union's approach to the migration-security nexus changing radically in the foreseeable future.³⁵ The fight against all forms of irregular migration through various measures will remain the core of EU

³¹ Grabbe (2000) p. iii.

³² Koff (2005) p. 399.

³³ *ibid*, pp 404-405.

³⁴ *ibid*, pp 410-411.

³⁵ Kicinger (2004) p. 8.

engagement. The vital question is not in which direction but rather how fast and how far this co-operation will develop.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO SECURITY

For Koff, migration is a market-based rather than a security-based issue. Immigration should not be perceived narrowly as a hard security issue but instead as an economic question best addressed in terms of markets.³⁶

The impression that enlargement will somehow weaken the Union's migration regime, and that Eastern Europeans are going to 'invade' Europe, is unfounded according to most studies.

In addition, facilitators of illegal migration, namely criminal organisations, are not significantly active in the new Member States. These are transit countries for traffickers rather than sending countries. For this reason, one cannot expect an increase in trafficking as a result of enlargement since the characteristics of the trafficking system will not radically change. Trafficking networks will continue to originate, for instance, in various Asian states, Turkey, Moldova, Georgia, and the Balkans, and will pass through Eastern Europe in the future as well.³⁷

One should keep in mind that the quality of life will improve in the accession states after enlargement, and they can be expected to become receiving states (a development which is already beginning), and this may actually, in the long run, alleviate pressure on Western Europe, as markets open up and illegal migrants find opportunity structures that are more favourable in the new member countries. Political debates surrounding migration and enlargement usually overlook the fact that, before the enlargement process began, most of the new EU member states were sending countries with significant smuggling and trafficking networks operating in them. Collective socio-economic improvements and institutional development have led to a decline in emigration flows, especially those of an illegal nature, most notably in Southern Europe.

Chances are that the EU's security-based approach will create a lot of difficulties for the new Member States in their struggle to control their borders. The extension of the external borders of the EU will create economic and identity-related problems in border areas that were integrated during the Cold War when all of these states

³⁶ Koff (2005) p. 410.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 411.

had Communist regimes. Many scholars have noted that border extension will probably have a negative impact on the local economies that have developed in border regions, such as those found between Poland and the Ukraine, or between Romania and Hungary: enlargement will block the relatively free movement of labour and trade which has developed in these areas. Similarly, ethnic minorities concentrated on separate sides of borders will be divided. There will be political and physical barriers between ethnic Hungarians living in Hungary and those residing in Romania, for instance. Since the fall of Communist regimes in the area, this border has been easily penetrated by members of the Hungarian minority in both directions. These developments will surely contribute to human smuggling and human trafficking because migration for economic and family reasons will be driven underground, like in Western Europe.³⁸ Grabbe notes that the disruption of bilateral relationships and regional economic integration has important implications for security in the region. It is especially the imposition of EU-driven border policies and visa regimes that inhibits the ability of local and regional actors to co-operate on a range of sensitive issues, including minority relations, migration, local economic infrastructure, and institution-building. Therefore, she calls for a more inclusive accession policy; an end to discrimination between applicants in EU visa policies; supplementary financial aid and political support to the countries farthest from accession; more support to bottom-up sub-regional co-operation across CEE; the involvement of applicants in external policies concerning their neighbours; and an overall EU strategy for the region that unites macro- and micro-security concerns.³⁹

Few scholars argue that borders should be fully opened or that migration should be deregulated, for such a proposition would be dangerous and politically unfeasible. What they do argue is that the EU and its Member States should introduce some flexibility and foresight into migration strategies, as they do in their economic policies. If this can be done, enlargement will not pose as much of a threat to the migration regime of the old EU 15, instead, it will increase opportunities to manage migration and reduce human smuggling and trafficking.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 412.

³⁹ Grabbe (2000) p. iii.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BORDER REGIONS OF HUNGARY, ROMANIA, UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA

The EU's immigration strategies focus on protecting the sovereignty of the Member States from transnational labour markets. Koff has argued that this approach does not adequately address market forces that drive migration, either legal or clandestine. Instead, the EU should link its migration policies to regional sub-national and trans-national development. Organised crime has already responded to the fundamental structural changes in labour markets that now extend beyond borders. Regulation policies should respond to these shifts as well in order to manage the flows of workers successfully.⁴⁰

The EU's regional policies have always recognised the internal differences that exist in the national economic markets. It seems counterintuitive that this logic is not utilised in migration strategies. Regional differences obviously create diverging needs for labour. In some EU-countries, most notably in Italy, regional governors have a voice in the compilation of the yearly migration quotas based on local economic requisites. Blanket border controls ignore these local needs, thus creating a market for illegal migration. In the new Member States migration pressures are especially sensitive. These states face a need for inexpensive labour in expanding economic markets, administrative and economic difficulties regarding border controls, and significant black market economies.⁴¹ As it has been mentioned earlier, trans-national economies have developed in many East European border regions where market and ethnic links predominate over national security interests.

The point is that if the EU were to address the migration issue more in terms of economic development and less in terms of security, enlargement could offer the Union the opportunity to manage migration in areas closer to the sending states. Instead of addressing the 'immigration problem', the EU should focus more of its efforts on building infrastructures in the new Member States, fighting organised crime and regulating the large black market economies. By concentrating on these issues, the Union's member states could provide a greater pool of legal jobs in Central and Eastern Europe, similar to those created in Southern Europe during the economic miracle of the 1960s and the boom of the 1980s.⁴² Moreover, by combating black market employment and deterring owners from hiring illegal

⁴⁰ Koff (2005) p. 412.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 413.

⁴² *Ibid.*

migrants by invoking measures such as fines, Member States could diminish the opportunities open to this latter group and reduce contact between migrants active in the irregular labour force and recruiters for criminal economic markets.


Turning back to security and boundaries, we should mention an important observation made by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde:

'In Eastern Europe, an entire set of new or newly independent states are grouping toward a pattern of security relations for which no historical precedent exists. As the dust of the Soviet collapse settles, we could be looking at the formation of several new security complexes. Crucial to this process will be how well or how badly the EU handles the tensions of its integrative-disintegrative dynamics. Also crucial will be whether Russia succeeds in reasserting itself as the hegemonic player within the CIS and whether the EU and the CIS conduct their relationship so as to create one integrated security region or two separate ones.'

As noted earlier, the new Member States in East Europe are particularly sensitive to migration pressures. This is probably even more so in the border regions for the following reasons.

The nature of boundaries is filtering at best. Therefore, they perform several of the activities described in the chapter on borders. Because of their location, the regions around them are more directly influenced by clandestine migration and organised crime, especially since these phenomena are taking place on their territories. This in itself makes them less attractive for the vast majority of the population to reside there. Lundén's sketch helps to explain the structural problem that border regions encounter.

Figure 1. A local but trans-national matter's path in the administrative system



Source: Lundén (1973) p. 189

We can assume that a boundary has negative effects on a border region's development since a problem shared across the border should usually be tackled first by regional and then by national authorities. This is because the nation-state's boundary divides two hierarchical systems of decision-making territories.⁴³ There is often the risk that information becomes distorted or de-prioritized.

In addition, peripheral regions already tend to be less developed than more central areas within the nation-states, especially in Eastern Europe. This is partly due to the centralised nature of power and administration, and more generally, because it is in a state's interest to integrate itself inwards, towards the centre. In principle, economic development takes place upwards in the hierarchy, which brings with it an increased significance of contacts, information and management on higher hierarchical levels, while links between states or regions on lower levels lose in importance.⁴⁴ As a result, infrastructure between states is still weak; exemplified by the remarkably low number of border crossing points in the area. This is particularly unfortunate in a region that will probably once again become increasingly divided through the strengthening of borders, this time in the form of the EU's external boundary, i.e. the border of the Schengen-zone. The number of crossing points should be increased immediately as well as co-operation with the Ukraine and Moldova, in ways that do not conflict with CIS-interests. To begin with, the dialogue between EU- and CIS-representatives has to be improved considerably.

Finally, as scholars like Koff and Kicingger have pointed out, sub-national or interregional co-operation is almost non-existent in security matters. Given

⁴³ Lundén (1973) p. 189.

⁴⁴ *ibid*

the relative successes of transnational organisations established within the EU-framework such as Euroregions and communautés de travail (ARGEs) in economic and cultural fields, for example, it is surprising how little competence has been delegated to local and regional levels. The current situation shows the extent to which security is still reserved for the level of units (states) and limited for subsystems (international organisations) and subunits (the sub-national level). The subunit level needs to become more powerful in tackling security issues as well, because it is strongly and directly influenced by them. Only thus can the negative consequences for Europe's border regions be mitigated and future Eastern enlargements turned into a more successful and more 'secure' project.

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