
THE EU AS A (HUMAN) SECURITY PROVIDER IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD

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INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics was in the core of European security policy towards Eastern European countries during the first ten years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the declarations of independence by the former Soviet republics opened the way to human security. Since the Human Security Doctrine for Europe was adopted in 2004, it has been, in fact, the mainstream ideology for foreign and security policy of the European Union toward the Eastern Neighbourhood (the policy is called “Eastern Neighbourhood Policy”, abbreviated as ENP).

The Eastern Partnership is a relatively new project of the European Union. Four platforms of the Eastern Partnership, such as (1) democracy, good governance and stability; (2) economic integration and convergence with the EU policies; (3) energy security; and (4) contact between people, have been based on the human security doctrine in a broad (European) understanding of this concept. The concrete programmes that have been implemented under the Eastern Partnership platforms are logically linked both with the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Human Security Doctrine for Europe (2004). However, the environment for the promotion of European values, including human rights standards and human rights protection mechanisms as well as human security principles in countries of the Eastern Partnership are different from conditions which shaped public/security policies in the 1990's. First, following on deepened contradictions inside the *eurozone* as a result of the financial crisis and *the Arab spring*, the human security concept has been perceived too liberal. The governments of some the EU member states, for example, Denmark, France and the UK declared their intentions to strengthen the national security systems and limit or withdraw to some extent their involvement in cooperative security mechanisms and external actions. In 2012 the eurozone passed through strong fallout caused by the global economic crisis and mass protests in Greece. The consequences of a possible

Greek exit from the eurozone or even from the EU were not predictable. Second, new political elites in Eastern European countries, in particular, in Belarus and Ukraine, are now less inclined to the adoption of the international mechanisms of human rights and fundamental freedoms into the public management systems, in particular, into the practice of judiciary and law-enforcement agencies.

Following Russia's example, the ruling elite in Belarus and Ukraine performs to stay apart from principles of democracy and human rights. It seems paradoxically that the current environment for promoting the liberal doctrine of human security in the Eastern European region is less favourable than it was in the 1990's.

HUMAN SECURITY IN WEAK AND FAILING STATES

In a hierarchy of political goods security occupies a privileged position. Starting from classical definition of the state by Max Weber to more contemporary publications by Robert Rotberg, (strong) states unquestionably control their territories and deliver full range and a high quality of political goods for their citizens (Rotberg, 1989). Human security is crucial for security of all contemporary states. Individuals alone cannot protect themselves from many different threats and attacks. (Strong) states provide protection of the borders and security of their citizens from environmental hazards, violence and crimes. They ensure political freedom and human rights. From a developmental perspective, the human security concept embraces both human rights and socio-economic and human development, because it integrates the economic component—protection from the threat of poverty and vulnerability to global economic crises with a number of societal components—, health security, food security, environmental security and personal security. States may succeed or fail in proving (human) security. Thus, state capacity is crucial for an assessment of the critical ability of the state to provide socio-economic development, human security and human rights.

In policy-making the interplay between priorities given either to the national interests or to human security varies from country to country. As a rule, human security- and human rights-based approach to development are embedded into public and security policies of the democratic strong states.

Initially, the phenomenon of state weakness/failure attracted the attention of international policy and academic communities in the 1990's (as a reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) and later, in the 2000's (due to the 9/11

terrorist attacks). Weak (failing, failed and collapsed) states are considered as a source of instability and insecurity they produce beyond their borders. Robert Rotberg considers state failure as a gradual process and distinguishes strong states from weak states, and weak states from failing, failed and collapsed states (Rotberg, 1989). According to a working definition adopted by the UK's Department of International Development, fragile states are "those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor". A state's propensity to weakness or even failure can be considered as a dynamic feedback among four sets of variables: its baseline level of institutional resilience; the presence of long-term drivers (or 'risk factors') of instability; the nature of the state's external environment (whether positive or negative); and the occurrence of short-term shocks or triggering events (Patrick, 2012).

Most sophisticated assessment of state failure conducted by the Fund for Peace links the gradual process of state failure with the risk of violent conflict. The Failed States Index is calculated on the base of 12 groups of indicators, including demographic pressure, massive movement of refugees or internally-displaced people, group grievance, chronic and sustained human flight, uneven economic development along group lines, poverty, sharp economic decline, criminalization and delegitimation of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension of the rule of law and violation of human rights, security apparatus operates as 'state within state', rise of factionalized elite and intervention of other states and external political actors (The Fund for Peace, 2011).

More important from a policy perspective is that features of failed states are attributed to both capacity and willingness of the government to overcome weakness. Applied to developing countries, the UK's Department for International Development finds four categories of weak states:

1. Good performers with capacity and will to overcome weakness (for example, countries of Eastern Europe before accession to the European Union). The necessity to correspond to the Copenhagen criteria justified high motivation of the governments in implementation of the principles of good governance, rule of law and international standards of human rights;
2. Weak but willing states where capacity is missing (for example, Georgia or Moldova). Technical assistance of the UN, EU and international organizations is effective tool in overcoming state weakness in this particular group of countries;

3. Strong but unresponsive states where political will is lacking within a usually repressive political regime (for example, Belarus). There is a special group of weak states—always an autocracy that rigidly controls dissent and is (temporarily) secure but at the same time provides very few political goods (Erin Jenne, 1999);
4. Weak-weak states in which there is neither capacity nor will to overcome failure.

It is a particularly difficult task to overcome state weakness, prevent state failure and violent conflict in the latter case due to the unwillingness of government to implement democratic reforms. Systematic violation of human rights results in mass protests and revolts in the repressive and weak-weak states. In the last two categories of countries, state weakness plays as a precipitating factor of violent conflict – in the first case it manifests itself through political repressions and state terrorism; in the second case it favours mass revolts for political power and access to resources. The Eastern Neighbourhood can be described as the region composed by weak states, each of which is ‘unhappy in its own way’. According to Robert Rotberg, Ukraine is an endemically weak state where state weakness is pre-conditioned by geographical, physical and structural economic constraints¹. Moldova is a fragmented state. Belarus is seemingly strong, but a repressive state (Rotberg, 1989). The Failed States Index shows the similarity of state weakness features in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, that manifests itself in the rise of factionalized elites and low legitimacy of the state. At the same time, poverty and economic decline are particular result of low state capacity in Moldova; whereas suspension of the rule of law and massive violations of human rights are the features of weakness in Belarus and Ukraine.

At the both (theoretical and practical) levels, the important strength of the concept of human security is that it embraces economic development together with human development and human rights. Separately, economic development measured as economic growth and performance of the economy is not a sufficient indicator in assessing a country’s progress toward human security. A relative progress toward achieving economic development that some of the Eastern European countries demonstrate is not necessarily accompanied with the implementation of the human security doctrine because economic development and human security pursue mutually advantageous, but nevertheless different goals.

¹ ‘Endemic disease’ (medicine dictionary) - a disease that is constantly present to a greater or lesser degree in people of a certain class or in people living in a particular location

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE: A BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a global programme for overcoming poverty and in pursuit of achieving greater human security. The MDGs focus on eight priorities, common for all countries: poverty and hunger, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, combating disease, environment and global partnership. *Table 1* shows the progress in achieving MDGs that Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrate.

Table 1. Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

MDG	Belarus	Ukraine	Moldova
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	⦿	⦿	◐
Achieve primary education	⦿	⦿	⦿
Promote gender equality	⦿	⦿	⦿
Reduce child mortality	◐	◐	◐
Improve maternal health	◐	◐	◐
Combat HIV/AIDS	◐	⦿	⦿
Ensure environmental sustainability	◐	⦿	⊖
Develop a global partnership	⊖	⊖	⊖

⦿ – achieved; ◐ – very likely to be achieved, on track;
 ◐ – possible to achieve if some changes are made; ⊖ – insufficient information

However, the MDGs are rather determine provision of economic, social and cultural rights and related priorities of human security, whereas political and civil rights are not covered by them. In accordance with MDG Monitor, Belarus demonstrates higher progress in achieving the development goals—by January 2012 most goals were achieved, whereas Ukraine and Moldova are still far away from planned indicators of development, in particular, in the areas of environment, child healthcare, HIV aids and maternity health. Economic development in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine correlates with social development. In 2010–2011, GDP per capita in Belarus was

significantly higher than in Ukraine and Moldova, which are ranked as the poorest countries in Europe. *Table 2* demonstrates the important components of the Human Development Index for the Eastern Borderland countries and new EU member states. A comparative analysis of indicators in the Human Development Index (UN, 2010–2011) demonstrates higher rank of human development in Belarus in comparison with Moldova and Ukraine despite the absence of democratic reforms and efficient policy of international organizations toward Belarus. On the Failed States Index the Eastern European countries are ranked in the following way: Belarus (83rd position), Russia (82nd position), Moldova (66th position), Ukraine (most stable – 110th position)—as it is shown in *Table 3*. The most strong and democratic states are Sweden, Norway and Finland (175th, 176th and 177th positions accordingly). The examples of ‘typical’ failed states include Sudan, Chad and Somalia.

Table 2. Components of the Human Development Index for the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and new EU member states, 2011

Country	Education index	Expenditure on health, public (% GDP)	Headcount of MPI poor (% of population)	Life expectancy at birth	Income Gini coefficient	MPI intensity of deprivation	Multi-dimensional poverty index	Population living below 1.25 USD	Under 5 mortality, 1000	Maternal mortality, women 100 000
Eastern European Borderland countries										
Belarus	0.776	4.9	0	0.794	27.2	35.1	0	0	12	15
Moldova	0.716	5.2	1.9	0.778	38	36.7	0.007	0	17	32
Ukraine	0.858	4.0	2.2	0.765	27.5	35.5	0.008	1.9	15	26
Eastern European countries, new EU member states										
Lithuania	0.883	4.5	0	0.824	37.6	n/a	0	0	6	13
Poland	0.822	4.6	0	0.885	34.2	n/a	0	0	7	6
Romania	0.831	3.8	0	0.851	31.2	n/a	0	0.5	12	27
Etalon countries										
Norway	0.984	7.5	0	0.964	-	n/a	0	0	3	7
Chad	0.219	2.7	62.9	0.446	45.6	54.7	0.334	0	209	12000
DRC	0.356	1.2	73.2	0.448	-	53.7	0.393	59.2	199	670

Table 3. The Failed States Index, 2011

	Demographic pressure	Refugees and displaced persons	Group grievance	Human flight	Uneven development	Economy	Legitimacy of the state	Public service	Human Rights	Security apparatus	Fractionalized elite	External influence
Belarus, 83 place	6.3	3.6	6.8	4.5	6.3	6.2	8.8	5.8	8.0	6.3	8.0	7.0
Ukraine, 110 place	5.3	3.1	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	7.4	4.1	5.5	4.0	8.0	6.8
Moldova, 66 place	6.1	4.4	6.6	7.5	6.5	6.7	7.6	6.3	6.5	7.8	8.0	7.2
Poland, 145 place	4.3	3.5	3.5	5.6	4.7	4.3	4.2	3.3	3.5	2.5	3.6	3.9
Lithuania, 149 place	4.1	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.7	5.3	3.6	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.8	3.8
Romania, 126 place	5.1	3.2	6.0	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.9	4.5	4.0	4.1	5.2	5.2

Tables 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate that new EU member states—Poland, Romania and Lithuania—can be referred as countries with strong states. In the 1990's this group was belonging to the category “good performers” with governments willing to overcome state weakness and poverty. Low level of state legitimacy and widespread violation of human rights are common features for Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, Moldova can be referred to as the country, the government of which is willing to overcome state weakness, whereas Belarus and Ukraine are referred as repressive state and ‘weak-weak’ state accordingly. The territory of Moldova is fragmented, indeed. Transnistria (de facto state, whose territory is not under the Moldovan government’s control) decreases the rank of Moldova in the list of weak states. In summary, economic growth and human development in the repressive state cannot prevent a country from instability, mass protests and revolutions. The Arab Spring is an example how fragile peace and stability are in countries with repressive and offensive states. In support of this argument, we can assess how the perception of comparative well-being and human security in Belarus will change, if we include human rights into general analytical framework. First, Belarus is the only one country in Europe where the death penalty is not cancelled. In Belarus most human insecurities are related to the limitation of the freedoms of expression and assembly. The leaders of civil society and democratic opposition are consistently repressed. In Ukraine, as shown in the Human Rights Watch report, there is a high level of social

exclusion, which affects socially vulnerable and discriminated groups, for example, HIV-infected, refugees, asylum-seekers, representatives of some ethnic minorities. The share of hate crimes has been dynamically on the increase (*Table 4*). Freedom House in *Nations in Transit 2011 report* gives a comprehensive assessment of the state of affairs in the area of human rights and good governance with usage of indexes: national democratic governance (NGOV), local democratic governance (LGOV), judicial framework and interdependence (JFI), civil society (CS) and corruption (CO). The index of national democratic governance (NGOV) for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is 6.75; 5.75 and 5.5 accordingly; the index of judicial framework and interdependence for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is 6.75; 4.5; and 5.5 accordingly. For comparison, Norway is the most democratic country in the world with NGOV = 9.64; SC = 10. North Korea is the least democratic country with NGOV = 2.5 and SC = 0. Among the post-Soviet states Turkmenistan is the least democratic (NGOV = 0.79; SC = 0.59). Estonia is the first ranked (NGOV = 7.5; SC = 8.82).

Table 4. Human insecurities in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Helsinki Human Rights Movement, local NGOs, 2010-2012)

Ukraine (endemically weak state)	Moldova (fragmented state)	Belarus (strong, but repressive state)
Tortures in pre-detention facilities; Limitation of mass-media freedom, freedom of expression and assembly; Death in custody under suspicious circumstances; Government monitoring of private communications; Frequent harassment of minorities and hate crimes; Trafficking in person; Unfair trial, selective justice	Poverty and severe economic decline; Chronic and sustained human flight (emigration about 30% since 1991); Armed resistance to governing authority; private armies, territory not under the central government's control (Transnistria)	Death penalty; Limitation of mass-media freedom, freedom of expression and assembly; Unfair trial, selective justice; Political repressions; Tortures and other violent treatment in pre-detention facilities

CONCLUSIONS

1. Eastern Europe is a region which consists of weak states, where citizens cannot feel secure. In one way or another, all human insecurities in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are related to inefficient and corrupt state machinery, ruled by rent-seeking elite. Criminalization of the state and unfair trials bring insecurities to people both in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Systematic violation of human

rights and cross-border threats ‘without passport’, such as organized crime networks built around illegal trafficking in person, arms and narcotics are common consequences of state weakness in all Eastern European countries.

2. Since no group of the ruling elite in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus is interested in the implementation of the rule of law and democratic reforms, two mutually supportive mechanisms have to be carried out in order to change the current state of affairs. The first mechanism is the rotation of elite. The second mechanism is putting pressure on the current political elite. The pressure “from the top” is put into effect by international organizations for stimulating the governments to follow democratic values. The pressure “from the bottom” comes from civil society for impelling civil control and the human rights-based approach to development. It is obviously a two-fold system of mechanism.
3. For the next decade the European Union has to re-think the ENP’s and the Eastern Partnership’s actions and measures. The ENP and the Eastern Partnership have to include the above mechanisms and apply them both for the creation of a stable, secure and prosperous environment, and for the protection of human security in partner countries.

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